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INDIVIDUAL SUPERVISOR LIABILITY IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
IN CALIFORNIA
Law cannot persuade, where it cannot punish.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits involving employment claims have been stead-
ily on the rise for a number of years. 2 Some estimates put the
increase in employment law cases at greater than 2000% for
the past twenty years.3 As indicated by the media, a large
portion of these cases involve discrimination or harassment,
or both.4
Employment discrimination and harassment cases are
generally personal disputes, involving an employee's liveli-
hood, job performance, and relations with co-workers and su-
pervisors. Consequently, it is understandable that plaintiffs
claiming that they experienced discrimination or harassment
on the job will want to include as a defendant the person they
feel is directly responsible for the illegal activity. Often, this
is the plaintiffs direct supervisor or manager who is empow-
ered with the ability to hire, fire and promote. However,
many California plaintiffs may not be able to hold a supervi-
sor individually liable for illegal employment conduct.
While it is well settled that supervisors can be held indi-
vidually liable for harassment on the job, there is a difference
of opinion on whether a supervisor can be individually liable
for discriminatory employment decisions. 5 Federal courts are
1. THOMAS FULLER, GNOMOLOGIA: ADAGES AND PROVERBS; WISE
SENTENCES AND WITTY SAYINGS, ANCIENT AND MODERN, FOREIGN AND BRITISH,
No. 3, 148 (London, B. Barker 1732).
2. Michael Schachner, Suits Send Employers Running for Cover: New
Statutes, Same Old Attitudes Create Liability Woes, Bus. INS., Nov. 21, 1994, at
57.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Page v. Superior Court (3NET Systems, Inc.), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529
(Ct. App. 1995).
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divided on the issue,6 and only one California appellate court
has addressed it. 7
Sexual harassment cases, such as Weeks v. Baker & Mc-
Kenzie and Martin Greenstein,8 with plaintiffs claiming out-
rageous and unimaginable behavior by the defendants and
juries awarding multi-million dollar verdicts, often gain the
headlines. Claims of discrimination, while less titillating, are
also quite common.9 There is a significant difference between
how the two cases are evaluated in the courts. 10 In Weeks,
the plaintiff claimed sexual harassment due to the egregious
conduct on the part of the plaintiffs supervisor that created a
hostile work environment." The law for harassment
(whether based on gender, race, or national origin) that cre-
ates a hostile work environment is quite clear: Individual su-
pervisors can be held personally liable for their conduct. 2
Conversely, employment discrimination is generally more
subtle and may not create a hostile work environment. Yet,
such discrimination is no less damaging to one's career, po-
tential income and self-esteem, than that faced by Ms.
Weeks. In California, a plaintiffs ability to hold a supervisor
individually liable for this type of subtle discrimination has
recently become more difficult. 13
6. See Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that supervisors cannot be held individually liable under ADEA), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 1049 (1993); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that supervisors should be held individually liable);
Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (holding individual supervisors liable).
7. See Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Ct. App. 1996).
8. No. 943043 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 20, 1992). In this highly publicized
case, the plaintiff, Ms. Weeks sued her former employer, the law firm of Baker
& McKenzie, and her former supervisor, Martin Greenstein. Ms. Weeks won at
trial with the jury awarding over $7,000,000. The award was later reduced. Id.
9. See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991) (discussing
the tremendous increase in discrimination cases and the dramatic shift from
discriminatory hiring to discriminatory termination cases over the first 26
years of Title VII).
10. Due to the wording of the statutes, individual supervisors can be held
liable for harassment claims, such as the one brought by Rena Weeks. See Mat-
thews v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1995).
11. Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 20,
1992).
12. Matthews, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354-55.
13. See Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Ct. App. 1996).
Although, some California appellate courts have allowed awards against super-
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
Courts disallowing individual supervisor liability have
generally relied on the doctrine of respondeat superior 1 to
hold the employer strictly liable for the actions of employ-
ees. 15 These courts also argue that supervisors are not re-
sponsible for discriminatory hiring, firing and promoting,
since these decisions are made or reviewed by the senior
management in the organization. 16 This line of reasoning
suggests that a lower level manager has little motivation to
circumvent corporate policies and hiring goals. 17 While this
logic may have been accurate in an economy dominated by
large, bureaucratic corporate entities, the premise may now
be outdated due to the significant changes that have occurred
in the U.S. economy that continue to reshape the dynamics of
the modern workplace.- 8
Recent employment trends have shifted much of the
workforce away from large corporate environments to
smaller, more entrepreneurial companies. 19 This reallocation
of the workforce has created a situation where more and more
employees are presumably working for managers with
greater responsibility and authority in making employment
decisions for their own departments and less training in em-
ployment related issues.20 The logic of these former decisions
should be reevaluated due to these recent workplace trends.
In addition to plaintiffs desire and ability to seek retri-
bution, the issue of individual supervisor liability is impor-
tant for a number of reasons. First, there is a debate whether
visors in their individual capacities without argument against such awards.
See generally Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 845 & n.3 (1995).
14. See discussion infra Part II.C.
15. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993) ("There
is no reason to stretch the liability of individual employees beyond the respon-
deat superior principle intended by Congress."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049
(1993).
16. Id. (commenting that employers will not tolerate employees that dis-
criminate, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[n]o employer will allow.., personnel
to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for the Title VII violation.").
17. Id. (commenting that an employer will "quickly correct the employee's
erroneous belief' that he can violate Title VII with impunity).
18. Vincent J. Schodolski, California Rebounds State is Recovering into
Changed - Some Say Fitter -Economy, CHI. TIB., Nov. 21, 1994, at Business 1
("[Statistics show that 90 percent of Californians are employed by companies
with 50 or fewer workers.") [hereinafter Schodolski]; James M. Gomez, The
Human Factor, L.A. DAILY TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1993, at The Times 100 (Magazine),
D2 [hereinafter Gomez].
19. Schodolski, supra note 18, at Business 1; Gomez, supra note 18, at D2.
20. Id.
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granting individual supervisors and managers immunity
from their actions may circumvent the broad purposes behind
both the federal and state employment discrimination stat-
utes.21 Some courts and authorities have argued that em-
ployees are deterred from discriminatory employment deci-
sions due to the threat of reprisal from an employer sued for
such actions. 22 Other experts disagree and suggest that hold-
ing supervisors individually liable is the best way to deter the
actions of the would be discriminator. 23
Second, in many cases, allowing individual supervisor li-
ability would thwart a defendant's ability to remove a case
based on diversity jurisdiction. The ability to name a local
supervisor or manager as codefendant defeats the complete
diversity required in order to remove the case to federal
court. 24 With the federal courts becoming increasingly inhos-
pitable toward employment discrimination plaintiffs,25 re-
moval to federal court may be a critical issue for plaintiffs.
Third, as previously mentioned, the drastic increase in dis-
crimination claims indicates that the resolution of this issue
will impact a large number of employment law cases, as well
as the rights of many employees.
This comment will review the express language of both
federal and California employment discrimination legisla-
tion, review the legislative intent behind the statutes, and
discuss significant cases that have interpreted the existing
statutes. 26 This comment will also address the differing judi-
cial interpretations of Title VII, and the few California cases
interpreting the state statute.27 Finally, this comment will
propose that the California Legislature clarify the statute in
21. See Miller, 991 F.2d 583 (holding that supervisors cannot be held indi-
vidually liable under ADEA); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that supervisors should be held individually liable);
Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (holding individual supervisors liable).
22. See Miller, 991 F.2d at 583.
23. Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). In order to remove to federal court under di-
versity jurisdiction, there must be complete diversity between the parties. Id.
25. Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over
Job Bias, N.Y. Times, reprinted in 137 CH. DAILY L. BULL. 144, July 24, 1991 at
2.
26. See discussion infra Part II.
27. See discussion infra Part III.
520 [Vol. 37
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order to avoid the inconsistent adjudication that has occurred
at the federal level.28
II. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Specifically, the Act states that it is "an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment."29 Essentially, Title VII
was enacted as remedial legislation to eliminate employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin and to compensate victims of such discrimination and
harassment.3 0 In order to achieve its goal of eliminating em-
ployment discrimination, the statute was intended to be in-
terpreted broadly. 1
Title VII defines employer as a "person" with fifteen or
more employees "and any agent of that person."32 The con-
troversy interpreting Title VII, and assessing liability has
arisen in large part because the statute does not define
"agent" or elaborate whether these agents should be held lia-
ble in their individual capacities. 33 This void has forced the
courts to interpret the statute based on its language, legisla-
tive intent and history.34 The differing interpretations of Ti-
tle VII have left a split in the circuits with respect to the
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
30. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983).
31. Robinson v. FEHC, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 791 (Ct. App. 1992).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
33. While Title VII does define "person," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and "em-
ployer," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), the statute is silent as to the definition of "agent,"
leaving it to the courts to interpret the definition and potential liability of such
agents. See James G. Sotos, Individuals Not Liable for Employment Bias:
Court, 141 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 107, June 1, 1995 at 6 (commenting that the
language of the Title VII statute has resulted in confusion).
34. See generally Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1993); Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs.
of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. IlM. 1994); Lamirande v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp.,
824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. IM. 1993).
1997]
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question of supervisor liability although there has been a con-
sensus growing in the circuits to not allow such liabilityY
B. The 1991 Amendment: Expanded Remedies
Prior to 1991, the remedies available to a plaintiff under
Title VII were back pay and reinstatement. 6 Practically,
these remedies were only enforceable against an employer,
since only an employer could reinstate an employee or pay
wages.37 Therefore, pre-1991 decisions that only held em-
ployers liable for employment discrimination were consistent
with the available remedies.38
However, Congress amended the Act in 1991. The
amendment invigorated the debate regarding the issue of in-
dividual supervisor liability by authorizing the award of com-
pensatory and punitive damages in Title VII lawsuits.39
With the addition of damages that can be paid by individuals,
some courts began to hold defendant supervisors and manag-
ers liable in their individual capacities.4" These courts rea-
soned that while only employers could reinstate employees
and be liable for wages, individuals could certainly be held
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.4 ' However, a
majority of courts have concluded that the additional dam-
ages authorized in the 1991 amendment have not fundamen-
35. Currently, a majority of circuits that have addressed the issue have
sided with the Ninth Circuit in rejecting individual supervisor liability. Smith
v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30
F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993). However, at least
one circuit court and other district courts have used primarily a strict construc-
tionist approach to allow for individual supervisor liability. Jones v. Continen-
tal Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1986); Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. 526; Bridges
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
36. Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785 n.2 (stating that "the 1991 amendments
allow for full compensatory damages - not just back pay - as well as punitive
damages.").
40. Bridges, 800 F. Supp. at 1180 (commenting that the damages argument
for not holding supervisors individually liable has 'teen undercut by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which authorizes the award of compensatory and punitive
damages.").
41. Id.
522 [Vol. 37
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tally changed the statute and continue to maintain that only
employers can be held liable under Title VII.42
C. Common-Law Agency and Respondeat Superior
Principles
Common-law agency theory holds that a principal is lia-
ble to a third party for the torts committed by an agent of the
principal.4 3 The doctrine of respondeat superior goes even
further in holding an employer vicariously liable for the torts
of both its employees, as well as, its agents.4 4 Under respon-
deat superior, an employer is liable for torts, including will-
ful, malicious, and criminal acts committed within the scope
of employment.45
These doctrines hinge on the responsibility of the em-
ployee to act in a certain fashion.46 The principle justification
for respondeat superior is that an employer may spread the
risk of loss as a cost of doing business. 47 In addition, an em-
ployer who has been held liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, may generally recoup his losses in an action
against the employee tortfeasor.48
D. The Ninth Circuit
In 1982 in Padway v. Palches,49 the Ninth Circuit estab-
lished its position that Title VII does not allow for personal
liability on the part of supervisors and managers. 50 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that since only employers could pay
42. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc,. 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that since the 1991 amendment limits damages by the size of the em-
ployer and was silent as to individuals, Congress did not intend to allow for
individual liability).
43. 3 CAL. Jun. 3D, Agency § 131 (1994).
44. Id.
45. Id. Scope of employment has been held to include anything that could
be regarded as incidental to employment or that which is done in connection
with employment. Tarasco v. Moyers, 185 P.2d 86, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947). Ad-
ditionally, even if an employee acts in excess of his authority or contrary to the
employer's instructions, the actions may still be within the scope of employ-
ment. Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, 882 (Ct. App. 1979).
46. 3 CAL. JUR. 3D, Employer and Employee § 91 (1994).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 968.
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back wages or reinstate an employee, managers and supervi-
sors could not be held liable.5'
The Ninth Circuit was not swayed by the addition of
compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to the 1991
amendment.52 In Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.,53
the court reaffirmed the stance it had taken in Padway.54
The court relied on the original statutory scheme that limited
liability under Title VII to employers with less than fifteen
employees to hold that Congress did not intend liability to
"run against individual employees." 55 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that since Congress did not want liability to run to
small companies with less than fifteen employees, Congress
would also not want liability to run to individuals, since the
burden of litigating a claim and paying damages would be
even heavier for individuals.56
Additionally, the Miller court relied on the fact that the
1991 amendment limited the size of the compensatory dam-
age awards by the size of the employer, and was silent with
respect to individual defendants, to support the proposition
that Congress did not envision individual liability.5 7 The
Ninth Circuit interpreted this silence as a clear rejection of
individual supervisor liability on the part of Congress. 58
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the inclusion of the word "agent" in the definition
of employer indicated that respondeat superior principles
should apply,59 thus precluding the availability of damages
against any such "agents" in their individual capacities.6"
E. Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Miller has sparked a de-
bate over individual supervisor liability, with some district
51. Id.
52. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. Id. at 587.
54. Id. (ruling that "this court's ruling in Padway that individual defend-
ants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII is good law.").
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 588.
58. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.
59. Id. at 587 (quoting the district court that "[tihe obvious purpose of this
[agent] provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the
statute.").
60. Id.
524 [Vol. 37
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
courts criticizing the approach the Ninth Circuit applied in
Miller.61 In Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co.,62 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York argued that the
inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages allows for
the imposition of individual liability on the part of
63supervisors.
In Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America,
Inc., 4 the Northern District of Illinois Court commented that
Congress was fully aware of the practice of holding supervi-
sors individually liable when it enacted the 1991 amend-
ment.65 The Jendusa court reviewed the legislative history
and explained that Congress discussed several cases where
individual supervisors were held liable and was, therefore,
aware of the practice. 66 The court reasoned that since Con-
gress was aware of cases in which supervisors were held indi-
vidually liable, it would have articulated an opinion on the
issue if it found the practice objectionable.67
In Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp.,68 the court re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that Congress' pri-
mary intent behind the fifteen employee minimum was to
shield small employers from the expense of litigation.69
Rather, the court concluded that the limitation was intended
to protect family-run businesses from discriminatory hiring
claims, since such small entities typically hire predominately
friends and families.7 °
While these district courts have been critical of the Ninth
Circuit, the overall trend recently has been to follow the
Ninth Circuit's lead in disallowing individual supervisor lia-
bility.71 Currently, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits have followed the logic of the Ninth Circuit
61. See cases cited supra note 34.
62. 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
63. Id. at 1180.
64. 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
65. Id. at 1016.
66. Id. (commenting that "it is fair to conclude that Congress was fully
aware of the practice of finding individuals ... liable for Title VII violations.").
67. Id. (observing that "[i]f Congress found this practice objectionable... it
surely could have voiced an opinion directly.... Congress' silence on the issue is
fully compatible with the conclusions ... that Congress did envision individual
liability.").
68. 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993).
69. Id. at 528.
70. Id.
71. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
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and have held that supervisors cannot be held liable in their
individual capacities.72 These courts all agree that neither
the wording of the statute nor the legislative intent of Title
VII do not allow for individual supervisor liability.73
However, the Sixth Circuit has yet to be persuaded and
continues to support individual supervisor liability in circum-
stances where the supervisor exercised control over the hir-
ing and firing decisions or had substantial participation in
the decision-making process.74
F. California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act 75
("FEHA") provides essentially the same remedial protection
from employment discrimination as Title VII. 76 As with Title
VII, the dual purposes of eliminating employment discrimi-
nation and compensating victims initiated the enactment of
FEHA.77 Also, FEHA is similar to Title VII by making it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, religion, creed, color, national ori-
gin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, marital status, or sex.78
However, the two statutes are written differently. The
definition of "employer" under FEHA differs from that of Title
VII. 79 FEHA defines "employer" as "any person regularly em-
ploying five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent
of an employer, directly or indirectly,"80 while Title VII de-
fines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . .and any
agent of such a person. " 81
72. EEOC v. A.I.C. Security Investigation Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.
1995); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Light-
ing Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th
Cir. 1994).
73. See cases cited supra note 29.
74. Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986).
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1995).
76. County of Alameda v. FEHC, 200 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1984) (in com-
paring the FEHA and Title VII the court commented that "the antidiscrimina-
tion objectives and the overriding public policy purposes are identical.").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1995) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b)(1988).
80. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12926(c) (West 1995).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
526 [Vol. 37
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The Act also contains a provision prohibiting harass-
ment.8 2 Specifically, it is unlawful "[flor an employer ... or
any other person ... to harass an employee or applicant."8 '
By allowing liability to run to "any person," the wording of
the harassment provision seems broader than that of the dis-
crimination statute by including co-workers, as well as,
employers.8 4
G. Fair Employment and Housing Committee Decisions
A California plaintiff pursuing an employment discrimi-
nation action under FEHA must first exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies by filing a complaint with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH").8 5 The DFEH may
decide to allow the aggrieved party to pursue the claim in a
civil action, or pursue the case itself by issuing an accusation
against the accused party and prosecuting the case before the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission ("FEHC"), an ad-
ministrative tribunal established under FEHA to hear em-
ployment discrimination claims.8 6 If the DFEH does prose-
cute the claim, the FEHC ultimately renders a decision based
on its interpretation of the existing law governed by the
Act.87 The FEHC may award affirmative relief and an ad-
ministrative fine in lieu of punitive damages.88
While there exists only one recent California appellate
decision regarding individual liability of supervisors, the
FEHC has regularly addressed the issue.8 9 The FEHC has
held supervisors liable in their individual capacity if they
were in a position to significantly affect access to employ-
ment.90 Thus, both the DFEH, the body that prosecutes the
FEHA claims, and the FEHC have interpreted FEHA as al-
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 1995).
83. Id.
84. See generally Page v. Superior Court (3NET Systems, Inc.), 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1995).
85. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12960 (West 1995).
86. Id. §§ 12965(a), 12967.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 12970.
89. See DFEH v. Madera County (1990) FEHC No. 90-03 at 27; DFEH v.
Del Mar Avionics (1985) FEHC No. 85-19 at 24-25; DFEH v. Bee Hive Answer-
ing Serv. (1984) FEHC No. 84-16 at 14-16.
90. DFEH v. Madera County (1990) FEHC No. 90-03 at 27.
5271997]
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lowing for individual liability on the part of supervisors that
can hire and terminate employees.91
The FEHC has relied on the express language of FEHA
in holding supervisors liable.92 FEHA states that it is unlaw-
ful for an "employer" to discriminate against a person "in
compensation or conditions or privileges of employment."93
FEHA defines employer as "any person regularly employing
five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly."9 4 The FEHC has inter-
preted the language of section 12926(c) as allowing for indi-
vidual liability.95
The FEHC has not required that the "person" in question
be an employer or agent in the traditional sense.96 Rather,
the FEHC has looked to the degree of control in which the
"person" has over the employment decision-making process.9 7
The FEHC has clearly interpreted the FEHA as enabling a
plaintiff to hold supervisors individually liable for their dis-
criminatory conduct if they possessed a requisite level of em-
ployment decision-making power. In discussing the defini-
tion of employer to hold persons liable under section 12940(a)
the FEHC has stated "[w]e have previously held liable as an
agent/employer those persons having supervisory status who
either themselves did the wrongful act or participated in the
decision-making process which formed the basis of the dis-
criminatory action."98
H. California Appellate Cases
Recently, in Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics,99 a Cali-
fornia appellate court finally dealt with the issue of individ-
91. See discussion supra Part II.F.
92. See DFEH v. Madera County (1990) FEHC No. 90-03 at 27; DFEH v.
Del Mar Avionics (1985) FEHC No. 85-19 at 24-25; DFEH v. Bee Hive Answer-
ing Serv. (1984) FEHC No. 84-16 at 14-16.
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1995) (This code section currently
makes it unlawful to discriminate in employment based on race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status,
or sex). Id.
94. Id. § 12926(c).
95. See DFEH v. Madera County (1990) FEHC No. 90-03 at 27; DFEH v.
Del Mar Avionics (1985) FEHC No. 85-19 at 24-25; DFEH v. Bee Hive Answer-
ing Serv. (1984) FEHC No. 84-16 at 14-16.
96. DFEH v. Madera County (1990) FEHC No. 90-03 at 27.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Ct. App. 1996).
528 [Vol. 37
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
ual supervisor liability with respect to an employment dis-
crimination claim. This was the first California appellate
decision on the issue. Although, some prior cases, including
some from the Second District, showed tolerance for allowing
individual liability, 100 the court in Janken held that supervi-
sors could not be held individually liable for discrimination
claims.101
The court relied heavily on prior federal opinions, includ-
ing Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc. The court also
stressed the difference between harassment and discrimina-
tion, the wording of the statute, the nature of personnel man-
agement decisions, and the Legislature's differing treatment
of harassment versus discrimination. 1 2
In particular, the Janken court reviewed the responsibili-
ties of supervisors and determined that harassment of co-em-
ployees was outside the scope of employment, and conducted
for "personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or
for other personal motives." 103 Therefore, harassment was
avoidable and supervisors could protect themselves from such
claims by simply refraining from harassing other employ-
ees. 10 4 Alternatively, the court reasoned that a supervisor
was required to make employment decisions, and therefore,
could not avoid potential claims of discrimination.Y° 5
As in many other decisions that have held that supervi-
sors cannot be personally liable for discrimination, the court
looked to the explicit wording of the definition of "em-
ployer."'0 6 The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the
"agent' language" was included to ensure that employers
would be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the actions of their employees.' 07
The court, citing Miller, reasoned that the Legislature in-
cluded the small employer exception in the statute to protect
such employers from the burdens of litigating discrimination
100. See Caldwell v. Montoya, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 845-46 n.3 (Ct. App.
1995) (commenting that no prior published California decision has addressed
the issue).
101. Id.
102. Janken, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741.
103. Id at 745.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 746.
106. Id. at 747.
107. Id. at 747-48.
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claims."°8 The court stated that it is "'inconceivable' that the
Legislature... intended to subject individual non-employers
to the burdens of litigating such claims."109
Finally, the court concluded by holding that personal lia-
bility would chill effective management, while providing little
additional benefit to victims of discrimination. 110 The court
opined that the specter of personal liability for personnel de-
cisions would "severely impair" a supervisor's judgment by
placing the supervisor in a position of making personnel deci-
sions that would be the least likely to lead to discrimination
claims."' The court argued that this scenario placed the su-
pervisor in an insidious conflict with his employer when mak-
ing employment decisions.
12
Prior to Janken, the Second District Court of Appeal had
taken the lead in supplying dicta on the issue of personal lia-
bility of supervisors for discriminatory employment ac-
tions." 3 Such dicta seemed to indicate that the Second Dis-
trict, as well as other appellate courts, would allow individual
supervisor liability.
In Jones v. Los Angeles Community College District, "
14
the Second District directly addressed the issue. In reversing
the trial court's summary adjudication of the claims against
the individual supervisors, the court held that there existed a
triable issue of fact-whether the individuals were acting as
agents for the school district." 5 Additionally, in response to
the argument that individual defendants should not be held
liable because an employer would pay any awards, the court
stated that "it does not logically flow from [this argument]
that [the individual defendants] cannot be sued and be liable
for any judgments against them ... only that under certain
circumstances, the public entity is obligated to pay a judg-
ment against the employee.""' Ultimately, the court allowed
108. Janken, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 752-53.
113. Carr v. Barnabey's Hotel Corp., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127 (Ct. App. 1994);
Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Ct. App. 1991); Jones v. Los
Angeles Community College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1988).
114. Jones, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
115. Id. at 48.
116. Id.
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the claims to proceed against the individual defendants that
could be proven to be agents of the employer.
In Valdez v. City of Los Angeles," 7 the Second District
Court of Appeal once again showed no aversion to allowing a
claim against an individual defendant to proceed if the proper
administrative procedures were followed. 1 18 The court af-
firmed the summary judgment motion on behalf of the indi-
vidual defendants because the plaintiff failed to name the in-
dividuals in the administrative complaint." 9 However, the
court was quite clear that they would have allowed such
claims if the individual defendants were named in the com-
plaint.1 20 The court held that "failure to name [the individual
defendants] in the administrative complaint is fatal to the
right to bring an action against them in the trial court."1
2 1
Associate Justice Johnson went even further in dissent-
ing with the majority's holding that the plaintiffs failure to
name the individual defendants was fatal to claims against
them.122 Justice Johnson believed that not allowing the
plaintiff to go forward would be inconsistent with the rules of
liberal construction required for FEHA cases.' 23
The following year, in Saavedra v. Orange County Con-
solidated Transportation Service Agency, 124 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal opted not to follow the Second District's
decision in Valdez.25 The court held that a plaintiff could
bring a suit against individual defendants that went un-
named in DFEH complaints. 1
26
In its decision, the court noted that the broad purpose of
the FEHA was to protect the rights of all employees from dis-
crimination in the workplace. 27 To that end, the court held
that "Saavedra cannot be barred from suing [the individual
defendant] because she did not file an administrative com-
117. Valdez, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 737.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 737-39.
123. Valdez, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (commenting that the FEHA should be
liberally construed to allow the plaintiff to bring his cause of action against the
three individual defendants).
124. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282 (Ct. App. 1992).
125. Id. at 284-85.
126. Id. at 285.
127. Id.
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plaint against him."128 While the main issue decided on ap-
peal was whether unnamed defendants could be sued, the
court was obviously quite willing to allow liability on the part
of individual defendants. The court was silent with respect to
any statutory construction arguments against individual
liability. 129
In 1994, the Second District, once again, addressed the
issue of individual supervisor liability in Carr v. Barnabey's
Hotel Corporation. 130 The court upheld a jury award against
both the corporate employer and the individual supervisor in
a sex and pregnancy discrimination suit.13' While the main
issue of the appeal was regarding the punitive damages that
were awarded, the court voiced no reservations to sustaining
the award against the individual defendant.13 2 Once again,
the court supplied no dicta questioning the appropriateness
of individual supervisor liability.
I. Harassment versus Discrimination in California
As indicated above, under the FEHA the wording of the
harassment provisions is broader than that of the discrimina-
tion portions.' 33 In Page v. Superior Court13 4 and Matthews
v. Superior Court,13 5 two sexual harassment cases, the Third
and Second Districts elaborated on the different wording
used in the discrimination and harassment sections of FEHA.
In both cases, while discussing the issue of individual super-
visor liability for harassment, the courts commented that the
harassment statutes were intended to be broader than the
discrimination statutes. 36 These holdings relied on the ex-
press wording of the harassment portion of FEHA that speci-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127 (Ct. App. 1994).
131. Id. at 129.
132. Id.
133. See supra Part II.F.
134. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1995).
135. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350 (Ct. App. 1995).
136. Page, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536 (commenting that "the Legislature further
indicated its intent to cast a broader net than it did with the age discrimination
provision by making FEHA's prohibitions against harassment and retaliation
apply to 'persons,' in addition to employers."); Matthews, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
355-56 (similarly stating that "[u]nlike discrimination in hiring, the ultimate
responsibility for which rests with the employer[,] ... harassment perpetrated
by a supervisor ... is a particularly personal form of the type of discrimination
which the Legislature sought to proscribe...").
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fies that a "person," and not just an "employer," can be held
liable for such actions.
13 7
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning in Miller has been
Questioned
The reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Miller has
been criticized by some federal courts. 138 One area of criti-
cism deals with the Ninth Circuit's approach to statutory
interpretation.
The plain language of a statute is the generally accepted
starting point of statutory interpretation. 139 Despite this
rule, the Ninth Circuit in Miller launched directly into a dis-
cussion of the legislative intent,1 40 disregarding use of the
words "any agent" by Congress. The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court that "the obvious purpose of this provi-
sion was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the
statute.' 4 ' However, it is questionable whether the respon-
deat superior explanation for including the term "any agent
of an employere is as obvious as the Ninth Circuit would
suggest.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,142 the U.S. Supreme
Court suggested a different result:
[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted
Courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area .... Congress' decision to define 'employer' to in-
clude any 'agent' of an employer ... surely evinces an in-
tent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible. 143
The Court went on to hold that, "[als to employer liability, we
conclude the Court of Appeals was wrong to entirely disre-
gard agency principles and impose absolute liability on em-
ployers for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the cir-
137. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12940(h) (West 1995).
138. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); In re Sanderfoot, 899
F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990).
140. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. Id.
142. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
143. Id. at 72.
5331997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
cumstances of a particular case." 1 " It appears that the
Ninth Circuit's strict reliance on respondeat superior princi-
ples to preclude individual supervisor liability is the type of
reasoning the Supreme Court denounced in Meritor.
Additionally, the common-law principles of respondeat
superior allow for employers to recoup damages that they are
required to pay because of the actions of employees. 145 How-
ever, the many courts disallowing individual liability, includ-
ing the Ninth Circuit, have eliminated an employer's ability
to subrogate such damages altogether. Therefore, an em-
ployer is held solely liable for the illegal actions of its supervi-
sory personnel, while the supervisor incurs no liability.
Some courts, critical of the Ninth Circuit, have inter-
preted the plain language of the definition of "employers"
within Title VII as clearly subjecting a supervisor, acting as
an agent of the company, to be found individually liable for
his actions. 146 "By incorporating 'agents' within the defini-
tion of 'employers', the plain language of the statute appears
to subject individuals to liability for engaging in unlawful em-
ployment discrimination."147
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire has interpreted the plain language of Title VII as im-
posing individual liability on supervisors. "In light of the
foregoing, the court gives effect to the plain language of sec-
tions 2000 e(b) and 2000-2(a)(1), which clearly impose indi-
vidual liability upon 'any agent of an 'employer.' "148 Even
the Ninth Circuit conceded that "the statutory construction
argument is not without merit."149 In actuality, a very strong
argument exists that the plain language of the statute calls
for individual liability.
144. Id. at 73.
145. 3 CAL. JuR. 3D, Employer and Employee § 91 (1994).
146. Douglas v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N. New England, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
518, 520 (D.N.H. 1994); Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526,
529 (D.N.H. 1993); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing the definition of employer and that the defendants
fall within such a definition).
147. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010
(N.D. mll. 1994).
148. Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. at 529.
149. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
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B. The 1991 Amendment
The debate regarding the legislative intent behind Title
VII intensified after the 1991 amendment that allowed for
compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to the tradi-
tional damages of back pay and reinstatement. 150 Some ar-
gue that these additional damages indicated a congressional
willingness to broaden the remedies available to plaintiffs.15
Since the pre-1991 Title VII damages were practically only
enforceable against an employer,1 52 the pre-1991 Title VII de-
cisions that consistently did not hold supervisors individually
liable were not surprising. However, the addition of compen-
satory damages to the 1991 amendment greatly enhanced a
plaintiffs ability to collect damages from an individual de-
fendant supervisor.1
53
The 1991 amendment influenced some district courts to
abandon the pre-1991 logic of the Ninth Circuit as espoused
in Padway v. Palches.15 4 These courts generally concluded
that the pre-1991 reasoning was outdated due to the new
damages available in the 1991 amendment.1 55 The argument
that the availability of these new damages also indicates a
congressional intent to allow for individual supervisor liabil-
ity is compelling, due to the overall expansion of plaintiffs
remedies, and should be followed.
The legislative history behind the 1991 amendment
reveals that Congress was aware of the practice of holding
supervisors individually liable in employment discrimination
150. See generally Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
151. Id.
152. Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
153. See Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. 769.
154. Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
[T]he rationale for adopting such a reading of Title VII has been under-
cut by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which authorizes the award of com-
pensatory and punitive damages .... Since such damages are of the
type that an individual can be expected to pay, there appears little rea-
son to adopt the reading of Title VII urged by defendants. Cases adopt-
ing the limited reading of Title VII were decided under the former ver-
sion of the Act and their reasoning is inapposite here.
Id.
155. Id.
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claims. 156 During the legislative debate prior to the enact-
ment of the amendment, Congress discussed several cases
that held individual supervisors liable.'5 7
The court in Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers of
America, Inc.,158 reviewed the legislative history of the 1991
amendment. 159 The Jendusa court concluded that Congress
was fully aware of these previous instances of finding individ-
uals liable for Title VII violations.' 60 The court commented
that "[i]f Congress found this practice objectionable or other-
wise inconsistent with Congressional intent it surely could
have voiced that opinion directly somewhere in the compre-
hensive reports accompanying the 1991 Act." 161  Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the respondeat supe-
rior holding that it made in Padway v. Palches 62 in 1982 is
questionable and apparently inconsistent with the legislative
intent behind the expansive 1991 amendment.
C. The Small Employer Exemption to Title VII
The Title VII definition of employer allows for an exemp-
tion for employers with less than fifteen employees. 63 The
Ninth Circuit in Miller theorized that the congressional in-
tent behind this small employer exemption was to protect
small entities with limited financial resources from poten-
tially high litigation costs and damage awards.' 64 The court
then went on to apply this reasoning to individuals. "If Con-
gress decided to protect small entities with limited resources
from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to
allow civil liability to run to individual employees."165 Unfor-
tunately, the Ninth Circuit does not cite any legislative de-
bate or other authority in reaching this position. This is in-
consistent with the known legislative history that reveals
Congress' knowledge and acceptance of individual supervisor
156. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1016.
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
164. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
165. Id.
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liability in previously decided Title VII discrimination
claims. 166
Additionally, other district courts have found fault with
the Miller rationale-that Congress' primary intent in estab-
lishing the small employer exception to Title VII discrimina-
tion claims was to shield employers with fewer than fifteen
employees from the expenses of litigation and potentially bur-
densome damages.167 The district court in Lamirande v. Res-
olution Trust Corp.,'16  believed that Congress intended to
shield small, family-run business from discriminatory hiring
claims, enabling these "Mom and Pop" operations to continue
to hire only friends and family without the threat of
litigation.' 69
Similarly, the Jendusa court was skeptical of the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in Miller regarding the protection of small
employers and individuals as the reason behind the small
employer exemption.170 The court stated that after reviewing
the legislative history of Title VII, it seemed "conceivable"
that other reasons besides protection of small employers from
the financial burden of litigating Title VII claims existed.
17 1
Further, it seems quite arbitrary to choose fifteen as the min-
imum number of employees if the primary reason was to offer
protection from the tremendous costs of litigation. The costs
associated with litigating a protracted discrimination case
and paying the damages would be tremendously burdensome
for firms even larger than fifteen employees.
166. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1014-15
(N.D. 111. 1994).
167. Id.
168. 834 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.H. 1993).
169. Id. at 528. "[Tjhis court respectfully notes that it is 'conceivable,' and
much more likely, that the size of the restriction contained in section 2000e(b)
was intended to protect small family-run businesses from discriminatory hiring
claims based on their preference for hiring friends and relatives." Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
[Tihis court cannot conclude that the desire to protect small businesses
from the costs of defending against a charge of discrimination was of
paramount importance in defining the term 'employer' and hence the
Ninth Circuit's reliance on that factor in refusing to recognize personal
liability strikes this court as the tail wagging the dog. Once it is recog-
nized that other factors were as, if not more, important in arriving at
Title VII's definition of 'employer,' the Ninth Circuit's argument loses
much of its force.
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While, as stated above, it would seem illogical that pro-
tecting small employers from the costs of litigation would
have been the only reason for creating the small employer ex-
emption, it is agreed that this was one of Congress' purposes
for limiting the size of employers liable under Title VII.172
However, this one factor should not be overemphasized in or-
der to shield individuals from liability for their discrimina-
tory acts.
Furthermore, this immunity for individual employees
seems inconsistent with the overall purposes of Title VII to
eliminate and deter employment discrimination. 173 As delin-
eated with harassment cases, holding individuals liable for
their egregious conduct would be an effective way to deter
such conduct.1 74 The Jendusa court did not agree with the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the protection afforded small
employers should be extended to all employees.1 75 The court
felt that the Ninth Circuit "works a slight of hand" by describ-
ing the small employer exemption as a desire to protect small
entities with limited resources and then mysteriously ex-
tending this desire to protect individuals. 76  Overall, the
court was not in favor of granting immunity to the perpetra-
tors of the illegal conduct because small employers were
granted exemptions.
Additionally, even if Congress intended to protect small
employers from the costs of litigation, why protect supervi-
sors and managers of larger companies? First, high level
172. Id.
173. Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Miller seems to be inconsistent both with Seventh Circuit law and,
more generally, with the broad purposes of the [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act]. The ADEA is designed ... to deter potential dis-
criminators, and the latter goal is undermined when people who make
discriminatory decisions do not have to pay for them.
Id. at 829 n.3.
174. Page v. Superior Court (3NET Systems, Inc.), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 534
(Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that "the policy of deterring and eliminating harass-
ment and retaliation in employment is served by holding a supervisor liable for
his own acts which are violative of FEHA in accordance with the plain language
of FEHA.") (emphasis added).
175. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1014-15
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
176. Id. (commenting on the extension of the small employer exemption to
individuals, the court stated "[we do] not find Title VII's or the ADA's limitation
on the size of covered employers to provide a sound basis for concluding that
Congress did not intend for personal liability to attach to individual deci-
sionmakers who otherwise qualify as 'employers' under these Acts.").
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managers of larger organizations control the employment de-
cisions of far more than fifteen employees. Second, quite
often an employer will be required to defend or indemnify a
supervisor for the costs of defending a suit. Therefore, the
only real cost supervisors would face are the damages
awarded against them for discriminatory conduct. This
seems like an illogical extension of the small employer ex-
emption, and the claim that the exemption was created solely
as a protection against the costs of litigating claims loses
much of its force when viewed from this perspective. 177
D. California Law
1. Differing Legislative Intent
As discussed above, there has been much debate regard-
ing the legislative history surrounding the 1991 amendment
and the small employer exemption included in Title VII.
178
However, even assuming that the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Miller is sound and consistent with congressional intent, it is
undoubtedly inconsistent with the history and legislative in-
tent of the FEHA and need not be followed by California
courts.
Once again, the Ninth Circuit states that the principal
congressional reason for setting a minimum number of em-
ployees required to be employed before an employer could be
held liable for a Title VII violation was to protect small em-
ployers, and ultimately individuals, from the costs of defend-
ing discrimination claims.' 79 While employers with less than
five employees are protected from defending a FEHA
claim,18 0 the California Legislature did not evince a similar
desire to protect small employers from the costs of litigating a
discrimination claim.18 1 Rather, the main reason behind the
177. Id. "Congress' desire to avoid destabilizing such an important sector of
the national economy is clearly justified. However, it simply does not follow
that Congress would, or should, have the same concern for protecting individual
actors in the workplace." Id.
178. See supra Parts III.B. and C.
179. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
180. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1995).
181. Robinson v. FEHC, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 789 (1992) (discussing the rea-
sons behind the small employer exemption) "The commentators uniformly ex-
plain the reasons for the exemptions as relieving the administrative body the
burden of enforcement where few job opportunities are available, and as keep-
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exemption in California's FEHA was to protect the state
against the tremendous administrative burden that might re-
sult from investigating claims against every employer, no
matter how small.18 2
Additionally, the California Legislature was particularly
concerned with the personal nature of the hiring decisions at
these very small companies (less than five employees).18 3
This is consistent with one of the proffered congressional con-
cerns of allowing small employers the freedom of hiring pre-
dominately friends and family members."8 4 In Jennings v.
Marralle,18 5 the California Supreme Court reviewed the his-
tory of FEHA and the legislative intent behind the regulation
without ever mentioning the desire to shield small employers
from the costs of defending an employment discrimination
claim.1 86 The supreme court cited Justice Tobriner's histori-
cal account of the exception that stated a significant reason
for establishing the California small employer exception was
the Legislature's desire to allow small business the ability to
hire family and friends without having to defend employment
discrimination claims.'8 7 Therefore, with respect to the small
employer exception, the intent of the California Legislature
clearly differs from that of Congress as expressed in Miller.
2. State Courts Should Not Follow Federal Decisions
Based On Differing Legislative Intent
While FEHA and Title VII are similarly worded, as dis-
cussed above, the intent behind the small employer excep-
tions clearly differ.' Traditionally, California courts view
federal decisions as instructional for interpreting state stat-
utes that are worded similar to federal statutes.' 9 However,
ing the agency out of situations in which discrimination is too subtle or too per-
sonal to make effective solutions possible." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1014-15
(N.D. 11. 1994).
185. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1994).
186. Id. at 282-83.
187. Id.
188. See discussion supra Part III.D.1.
189. Page v. Superior Court (3NET Systems, Inc.), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 534-
35 (Ct. App. 1995).
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for the issue of individual liability for supervisors, this
method of interpreting the statute should not be employed. 190
While as a general rule California courts have looked to
federal decisions under Title VII for assistance in inter-
preting FEHA "where appropriate,"... it is not appropri-
ate to follow federal decisions where the distinct language
of FEHA evidences a legislative intent different from that
of Congress .... Miller thus provides no guidance on the
question of the personal liability of supervisors under
FEHA. 191
3. DFEH and FEHC Interpretations of FEHA
It is generally accepted that courts should give great
weight to the FEHC in interpreting the FEHA.192 As dis-
cussed above, the FEHC has regularly held individually su-
pervisors liable. 198 The FEHC's interpretation of its gov-
erning statute is illuminating and should be followed by
California courts. Its decisions are based on the plain lan-
guage of the FEHA's definition of "employer."194 Once again,
courts should defer to this FEHC determination that when
supervisors have sufficient control over employment deci-
sions, they can be held individually liable.
4. Broad Construction Required
Within the FEHA itself, the California Legislature di-
rected that "[t]he provisions of this part shall be construed
liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof."' 95
The California Supreme Court agreed that courts "must con-
strue the FEHA broadly" in order to effectuate the goal of
eliminating employment discrimination. 196 The arguments
against individual supervisor liability are at odds with the
California Legislature's clear mandate to construe the statute
broadly in order to accomplish the goals of this "remedial leg-
190. Id. at 535-36.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 534 (commenting that while the issue is one of law, California
courts should give great weight to FEHC's interpretations of the statutes that it
regulates).
193. See discussion supra Part II.G.
194. See discussion supra Part II.G.
195. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12993(a) (West 1995).
196. Robinson v. FEHC, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 791-92 (1992).
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islation."197 Most arguments against individual supervisor li-
ability attempt to narrow the meaning of the definition of em-
ployer as given in section 12926(c). 198 However, a broad
interpretation of section 12926(c) clearly calls for holding
any person acting as an agent liable for discriminatory em-
ployment practices.
Additionally, to argue against individual supervisor lia-
bility under FEHA would require an interpretation of section
12926(c) that renders the words "any person acting as," pre-
ceding the words "an agent of an employer, directly or indi-
rectly," surplusage. If the legislative intent were to only hold
the actual employer, in the traditional sense, liable, then the
Legislature could easily have done so without the addition of
the words "any person." The California Supreme Court has
held that statutory constructions that create surplusages are
to be avoided.' 99 Therefore, California courts should not re-
strict the meaning of the words "any person" in the definition
of employer, but rather should construe the statute broadly.
5. California Appellate Courts
Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics,20 0 is the only Califor-
nia appellate court to squarely address the issue of individual
supervisor liability. In holding that individual supervisors
could not be held liable under FEHA for their discriminatory
actions, the court relied heavily on the difference between
harassment and discrimination and the fact that many fed-
eral courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have disallowed such
liability.2 ° ' Interestingly, the court never mentions the reme-
dial purposes of the statute, the legislative mandate to
broadly interpret the language of the statute, the differing
language between Title VII and FEHA, or the FEHC inter-
pretations that allow for individual liability.2 °2
The court began its analysis by detailing the difference
between harassment and discrimination.20 3 The court con-
197. Id.
198. See generally Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993) (interpreting the similar Title VII definition of employer narrowly in or-
der to prevent individual supervisor liability).
199. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. FEHC, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1987).
200. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Ct. App. 1996).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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cluded that while harassment is outside the scope of employ-
ment and, thus, avoidable, a supervisor cannot avoid making
personnel decisions that might be interpreted as discrimina-
tory.204 However, discrimination in hiring, firing, or promot-
ing is no more a part of the job than harassment of co-work-
ers. Supervisors that discriminate should not be protected
from liability because they are required to make personnel
decisions any more than harassers should be protected be-
cause they must regularly communicate and interact with
employees.
It also follows that if supervisors can refrain from
harassing co-workers, they can also refrain from discriminat-
ing against subordinates. Ultimately, if the supervisor fol-
lows corporate policies and makes non-discriminatory deci-
sions, no liability should accrue.
The court also reasons that the broader wording of the
harassment statute indicates a legislative intent to preclude
individual liability for discrimination claims. 20 5 This is simi-
lar to the dicta of Page20 6 and Matthews 207 indicating that the
Legislature intended to "cast a broader net" with the harass-
ment portion of FEHA than with the discrimination portion
of the statute.20 8 However, it is arguable that this intent to
broaden the scope of liability for harassment should not be
seen as disallowing individual supervisor liability. The har-
assment statute expressly allows for "persons" to be liable.20 9
However, the fact that the language of the harassment
statute is broader than the discrimination statute is not in-
consistent with holding individual supervisors liable for dis-
crimination. Any co-worker has the ability to harass a fellow
employee on the basis of race, color, religion, age or any other
protected classification. The authority to hire, fire, or pro-
mote the co-worker is not needed to participate in such egre-
gious and unlawful conduct. Conversely, to be able to dis-
criminate in the hiring, firing, and promotion of employees, a
supervisor must possess some control over such decisions.
Thus, only those persons with such control should be held lia-
204. Id.
205. Id. at 745.
206. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
208. See discussion supra Part II.H.
209. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12940(h) (West 1995).
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ble for discrimination.21 0 Therefore, it is entirely consistent
with the remedial nature of FEHA to hold any persons that
harass co-workers liable, while also limiting liability for dis-
criminatory actions to those employees that possess the au-
thority to affect employment decisions. This broader net cre-
ated for harassment claims should not be used to establish
immunity for supervisors making discriminatory employ-
ment decisions.
Other cases, prior to Janken, tangentially dealt with the
issue of individual supervisor liability, and exhibited a toler-
ance for such liability.2 11 Jones v. Los Angeles Community
College District21 2 is such a case. While overturning a sum-
mary judgment, the Second District determined that a super-
visor can be sued and held liable for his actions, even though
the public entity may ultimately be responsible for paying the
claim.2 13 While this was a 1988 case, and prior to both
Janken and Miller, the interpretation of the court is instruc-
tive. The court provided an analysis of the common-law
agency principles that the supreme court stated should be fol-
lowed in employment discrimination cases.21 4 Additionally,
the court held that the ultimate responsibility for paying the
damages is irrelevant with respect to the aggrieved party's
right to pursue a claim against the actual wrongdoer.2 15 The
employer and the supervisor can resolve the question of ulti-
mate responsibility at a later date, if necessary.216
The decisions in Valdez21 7 and Saavedra21 1 are also illu-
minating and illustrate how the opinions of various judges
differ on this issue. While these two cases addressed the abil-
ity of plaintiffs to bring actions against parties not named in
the original DFEH complaint, both courts referred to the
plaintiffs "right" to bring a claim against the individual de-
210. Id. § 12926(c).
211. Carr v. Barnabey's Hotel Corp., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127 (Ct. App. 1994);
Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct. App. 1991); Jones v.
Los Angeles Community College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37 (Ct. App. 1988).
212. Jones, 244 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct. App. 1991).
218. Saavedra v. Orange County Consol. Transp. Serv. Agency, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d 282 (Ct. App. 1992).
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fendants.2 19 Since FEHA was enacted as civil rights legisla-
tion to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, these opin-
ions pronounce an accurate interpretation of the remedial
nature of the act. These courts were clear that, because of
the origins and purposes of FEHA, aggrieved persons have a
right to pursue claims against those who discriminate
against them, including supervisors.
IV. PROPOSAL
The California Legislature should amend the FEHA to
clearly establish liability on the part of individual supervisors
that discriminate in the workplace. Such an amendment is
the most efficient way to achieve the remedial goals of elimi-
nating workplace discrimination envisioned by the Act.
Without such legislative action it is likely that courts in the
varying districts will interpret the statute differently, thus,
leading to a similar split that has developed in the federal
court system regarding this issue.220 The obvious conse-
quence of such a split in authority within California would be
years of inconsistent adjudication of claims of this civil right.
The Legislature should avoid the inevitable judicial confu-
sion, and probable forum shopping, that will result from the
current language of the statute and clearly amend the statute
to include liability for any employer, or any supervisor with
sufficient power to hire or promote.
V. CONCLUSION
While the federal circuits are forming a consensus in dis-
allowing individual supervisor liability, California courts
should not follow this lead. Although the stated goals of both
Title VII and FEHA are identical, a clear disparity exists be-
tween the legislative history and intent behind the two stat-
utes. The California Legislature, as well as the courts,
should recognize these differences, and the important varia-
tion in the express wording of the laws, and should conform
with the mandate supplied by FEHA to interpret the statute
broadly in order to achieve its remedial purposes.
The need for a broad interpretation is ever-increasing
due to the fundamental economic and social changes occur-
219. See discussion supra Part II.H.
220. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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ring in California. In an era of increased workplace diversity,
corporate downsizing, growth of entrepreneurial start-up
firms, and a decline in affirmative action, the courts should be
vigilant in the protection of the right to be free from discrimi-
nation in employment. A broad interpretation of FEHA, in-
cluding individual supervisor liability, is the best way to de-
ter discriminatory conduct in the workplace. The
perpetrators of such illegal conduct should be held personally
responsible. This will not only benefit employees typically
subject to discrimination, but ultimately employers would
also gain from having to defend fewer discrimination claims
and from creating a more harmonious workplace.
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